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Abstract-A direct and elementary proof of purification for a finite version of a nonatomic game is 
provided. 
In 1973 David Schmeidler provided a purification result for a class of nonatomic games using 
measure theory [l]. (Another formulation of this model has been provided by Mas-Collel [2] and 
extended by Khan and Sun [3].) Using the Shapley-Folkman Theorem, Rashid [4] provided a 
proof of purification for a finite analogue of Schmeidler’s result. A direct and elementary proof of 
purification is provided below, whose constructive nature makes it amenable to a computational 
approach. 
We begin with a finite set of players, 1,2,. . . , n, and the non-negative unit simplex S,,, on 
m-dimensional commodity space. An nm-dimensional vector is announced, allocating a vector 
in the simplex to each of the n players. Every player disregards the bundle allocated to him, 
but keeping in mind the vectors allocated to all other players, chooses a bundle in the simplex 
that maximizes his utility. An individual’s utility is dependent both upon what he gets as well 
as what every other player gets; the utility function is linear in the bundle chosen by the player 
and continuous as a function of the vectors allocated to all other players. If f denotes the vector 
of allocations across all players but player t, and zt the vector chosen by player t, then the tth 
player’s problem can be stated as below, where kt = i + z1 
where each V& is a continuous function of ft. A choice of strategies ($1,. . . , c,,) is a (Nash) 
equilibrium if, for all players and all p E S,, z1 . V(t,&) > p . V(t,~?t).l The existence of 
equilibria for problem A is a special case of classical results and will be assumed. In general, the 
equilibrium vectors chosen will not be pure strategies-i.e., except for a set of measure zero-uses 
a pure strategy. This result may be represented in matrix form as below, with the rows adding 
up to one, and the columns adding up to Ki, . . . , Km, respectively, 
211 . . . Xlm 1 
. . 
C,l . . . %m I 
K1 . . . I-C, n 
I am grateful to C. Blair and D. West for comments. 
‘Strictly speaking, the agents should be maximizing I - V(t,&) but this makes no difference for the asymptotic 
results. 
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THEOREM 1. We can rearrange the above matrix such that, for no more than m traders, each 
row is a unit basis vector, with the 1 in a position which had a positive entry. 
PROOF. We begin by making some simplifications. If any row consists of a unit vector, remove 
the row and relabel. Every row of the matrix will contain at least two positive elements. We 
have at least 2n positive elements in the matrix. 
Will we have at least one cycle obtained by joining positive elements? E.g., iljl * ilj2 -+ 
i2 js + i3 js ---i ia j,, where ik jl indicates the positive element in the kth row and Ith column of 
the original matrix. Well-known theorems about the transportation problem or representations 
of matrices as bipartite graphs assure us of the existence of a cycle if we have at least m + n 
positive elements, e.g., Dantzig [5]. As our matrix has 2n positive elements, we can assume a 
cycle is found. 
Let 6 = min ik j,, 1 - ik jl, where the minimum is taken over all elements in the cycle. Suppose 
this occurs at il j, . Define a new set of values such that il j, = 0, il j2 = il j2 +6, i2 j2 = i2 j2 - 6, 
etc. If the minimum occurs at (1 - ik jl), note that it must also occur at some other element in 
the same row, and row ik turns into a unit vector. 
The new matrix now has (at least) one more zero than the original matrix. Continue this 
process, removing rows which become unit vectors until m 2 n. I 
COMMENT. The well-known results referred to earlier suffice for an asymptotic version of Schmei- 
dler’s Theorem, but it is possible to use the fact that each (included) row has at least two positive 
elements to provide a slight refinement. Starting at an arbitrary positive element in row il, move 
to the positive element in row il with smallest column index j, whose row index is is smallest . . . 
and so on. If the algorithm fails to produce a cycle, remove the rows and columns traversed in 
the search. If the search fails and uses 2k elements, then, for the reduced matrix, 
No. of positive elements < 2n - 2k 
Total no. of elements - mn-kn-(m-k)k 
2n - 2k 
= (m-k)(n-k) =A’ 
Hence, k = m - 2 is the maximum number of elements that can fail to lead to a cycle. 
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